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This paper points to some elementary conflicts between the claims of interpersonal and
intergroup justice as they manifest themselves in the process of seeking a real-valued
index of poverty which is required to satisfy certain seemingly desirable properties. It
indicates how ‘group-sensitive’ poverty measures, similar to the Anand-Sen (1995)
‘Gender Adjusted Human Development Index’ and the Subramanian-Majumdar (2002)
‘Group-Disparity Adjusted Deprivation Index’, may be constructed. Some properties of
a specific ‘group-sensitive’ poverty index are appraised, and the advantage of having a
‘flexible’ measure which is capable of effecting a tradeoff between the claims of
interpersonal and inter-group equality is spelt out. The implications of directly
incorporating group disparities into the measurement of poverty for poverty
comparisons and anti-poverty policy are also discussed.
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1 Motivation
This paper combines the themes of both poverty and inequality, within a measurement
setting, with a view to elucidating some of the complications that can arise, and how
these might be addressed, when we allow for a certain elementary obtrusion of
considerations of ‘society’ into routinely mainstream notions of the ‘economy’.
Specifically, the concern is with reckoning aspects of distributive justice from a group
perspective, in addition to the more standardly individualistic perspective, with an
emphasis on the sorts of conflicts which these alternative perspectives could engender,
and how these conflicts might be reconciled in the process of seeking a real-valued
measure of income poverty. The two perspectives of distributive justice just alluded to
are handily described by Stewart (2002) in the terms, respectively, of horizontal
inequality and vertical inequality. Much of received theorizing has been concerned
almost exclusively with vertical inequality, which has tended to confine horizontal
inequality, in a relative sense, to the unhappy status of what Stewart (op. cit.) calls ‘a
neglected aspect of development.’ The question of why groups deserve a great deal
more analytical and empirical attention than they would appear to have received in the
discourse on poverty, inequality and development has been dealt with fairly
exhaustively in Stewart’s work, and therefore represents ground that one does not need
to cover here again. Reference, in this context, must also be made to earlier work,
notably from the viewpoint of measurement, by Anand and Sen (1995), Jayaraj and
Subramanian (1999), Majumdar (1999), Majumdar and Subramanian (2001), and
Subramanian and Majumdar (2002).
It is perhaps important to stress that the analytical content of this paper – whether in the
matter of the existence results it advances or the specific poverty measures it discusses –
is not motivated by any illusion as to either its revelation- or novelty-value. The
arguments in this paper are, on the whole, uniformly simple and obvious. It is perhaps
precisely because of this obviousness that attention needs to be drawn to the pervasive
reality and centrality of groups in any assessment of social welfare; and the motivational
concern of this paper is, simply, to point to the obvious so that it is not overlooked.
There is nothing very paradoxical in this: it is just another instance of Edgar Allan Poe’s
purloined letter. If the notion of horizontal inequality has met with traditionally little
engagement in exercises dealing with the assessment of overall deprivation or well-
being, this fact probably has much to do with the common failure of being blind to what
stares one in the face (excepting, of course, those instances of a deliberate ideological
opposition to the notion of groups and their relevance in the scheme of things). The
motivational objective of this paper, therefore, is to highlight an issue for reasons which
arise not from its complexity, but from a combination of its importance and its relative
historical neglect.
2 Measuring poverty in a stratified society
An issue of potential interest in the measurement of poverty has to do with the way in
which poverty is distributed across different well-defined subgroups within the2
population1. Foster and Shorrocks (1991) have advanced and studied a property of
poverty indices which they call subgroup consistency and which demands that, other
things equal, an increase in any subgroup’s poverty should increase overall poverty. In
motivating their discussion of this property, the authors (1991: 687) state: ‘Subgroup
consistency may ... be regarded as a natural analogue of the monotonicity condition of
Sen (1976), since monotonicity requires that aggregate poverty fall ... if one person’s
poverty is reduced, ceteris paribus, while subgroup consistency demands that aggregate
poverty fall if one subgroup’s poverty is reduced, ceteris paribus.’ In this connection, it
is immediately tempting to seek also an analogy between the conventional transfer
axiom and a corresponding one which could be defined for subgroups.
The transfer condition requires that, ceteris paribus, a progressive rank-preserving
transfer between two poor individuals should be accompanied by a reduction in poverty.
In a similar spirit, one could require – speaking loosely for the moment – that aggregate
poverty should decline with a move toward equalization, through income redistribution,
of subgroup poverty levels, other things remaining the same. The requirement is
formalized, in this note, through the postulation of a property called subgroup
sensitivity.
The relevance of subgroup sensitivity is captured in the following illustration. Suppose
poverty to be measured by the simple headcount ratio. Imagine that the population is
partitioned into two subgroups, A and B, where A stands for a historically
disadvantaged social group, say, and B stands for the rest. Suppose the headcount ratio
of poverty for subgroup A to be 0.7 and that for subgroup B to be 0.3. If subgroup A’s
share in total population is 50 per cent, then the headcount ratio for the population as a
whole would be 0.5 (= 0.5*0.7 + 0.5*0.3). If now there is a pure redistribution of
income from subgroup B to subgroup A, whereby A’s headcount ratio is reduced to 0.6
while B’s headcount ratio is raised to 0.4, then we may be disposed to judge that such a
movement toward equalization of poverty across subgroups should lead to an overall
reduction in measured poverty. This, precisely, is the sort of judgment that would be
endorsed by the axiom of subgroup sensitivity. Such a possibility, however, is not
accommodated by the headcount ratio which, in the context of the present example,
continues to remain at 0.5 (= 0.5*0.6 + 0.5*0.4). This simple example points to a
possible limitation underlying conventional approaches to the measurement of poverty.
The difficulty in question resides in the fact that certain axioms for poverty
measurement have been advanced on the implicit assumption that there is no more than
one group – that constituted by the population as a whole – which needs to be reckoned
in an overall assessment of the extent of poverty in a society. This assumption is
particularly salient in the so-called ‘symmetry’ and ‘transfer’ axioms. The former
property demands, in essence, that in making poverty comparisons across income
profiles, the personal identities of individuals should be of no account. This property is
also a standard feature of the literature in social choice theory, where it more commonly
goes by the name of the ‘anonymity’ axiom. One can immediately see that if the identity
of an individual is linked to the fact of group affiliation, then a poverty index which is
1 For analyses of poverty measurement when different groups are perceived to have different needs, as
reflected in variations in subgroup poverty lines, see Atkinson (1987) and Keen (1992). While the
concern in these papers, as in the present one, is with reckoning subgroup poverty in the measurement
of aggregate poverty, the underlying motivations are rather different.3
sensitive to the group composition of a population could well militate against the
requirement of anonymity imposed by the symmetry axiom. The axiom in question is
widely regarded as being completely innocuous and self-evidently desirable from an
ethical point of view: it is, indeed, so much taken for granted that its social choice
version – anonymity – has come in for specifically targeted criticism in a carefully
argued assessment by Loury (2000), who refers to the anonymity axiom as a stark
example of ‘liberal neutrality’. What could constitute a possible objection to
symmetry/anonymity which, after all, echoes a requirement that is a feature of many
liberal constitutions – the requirement that no person may be discriminated against on
the grounds of birth, race, class, caste, religion, or sex?
Here is an objection: one may wish to discriminate in favour of members of an
historically oppressed and consequently currently disadvantaged group; but in order to
discriminate in favour of somebody, one will have to discriminate against somebody
else on the ground of the latter’s group affiliation – an avenue of redress for the former
individual which is denied by the symmetry axiom. Briefly, symmetry cannot be
reconciled with group-based principles of distributive justice such as are embodied in
provisions like ‘compensatory discrimination’ or ‘affirmative action’. The preceding
discussion suggests that symmetry is an unquestionably desirable property when one is
assessing inequality or poverty or welfare in the context of a homogeneous population;
however – and possibly because of repeated, mechanical use – often the qualifying
attribute of homogeneity seems implicitly to be forgotten when the axiom is invoked.
Indeed, one of the few authors who are careful to rationalize the symmetry axiom on the
grounds of its appeal in the context of homogeneous populations is Shorrocks (1988).
One could, of course, suppose that symmetry is so widely specified as a desirable
property only because of a formally unstated assumption as to the homogeneity of a
population; but somehow, this is a less than convincing explanation when the axiom is
also routinely invoked in the context of exercises which explicitly accommodate groups
into the analysis, and therefore are concerned with heterogeneous populations.
Similarly, where the transfer axiom is concerned, one can see that considerations of
intergroup equality could, in specific cases, conflict with considerations of interpersonal
equality. Regressive transfers between members of a homogeneous group may naturally
be taken to reduce welfare and enhance inequality and poverty; but should the same
outcome necessarily hold for transfers between individuals belonging to different
groups in a heterogeneous population? It is these sorts of difficulties in attending the
measurement of poverty that are sought to be made transparent in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 deals with certain relevant
preliminary formalities of concepts and definitions. Section 4 presents a couple of
general possibility theorems on poverty indices which highlight the complications that
can arise from taking the issue of group-wise poverty distribution seriously. Section 5
offers a brief interpretation and assessment of the results presented in the previous
section. Examples from the literature of ‘group-sensitive’ poverty measures are
discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 carries a brief discussion of the implications of
‘group-sensitivity’ for budgetary intervention in poverty redress exercises. Section 8
concludes.4
3 Formalities2
Let N be the set of all positive integers. For every n∈N,l e t Xn be the set of nonnegative
vectors {(x1,...,xi ,...,xn)}, and define X to be the set ∪n∈NXn. A typical element of the
set X is an income vector x, a typical element xi of which stands for the income of
person i (i∈ N). For every x∈ X,n ( x) stands for the dimensionality of x.T h epoverty
line, z, is a positive level of income such that individuals with incomes less than z are
certified to be poor. For every (z,x)∈ T×X (where T is the set of positive reals), xP(z,x)
will stand for the vector of poor incomes; xR(z,x) will stand for the vector of nonpoor
incomes; and µ
P(z,x) will stand for the average income of the poor population. A vector
x∈ X will be said to be derived as a permutation of a vector y∈ X if x = yΠ for some
permutation matrix Π;a n dx
o is the ordered version of x if x
o is derived from x by a




i+1 (i = 1,...,n(x)–1).3 For all x,y∈X, it will be said that x









i for some i; x will be said to be derived from y through an increment to a
person’s income if x and y are equi-dimensional, xi =y i for all i ≠ k and xk >y k for some
k; and x will be said to be derived from y through a permissible progressive transfer if x
and y are equi-dimensional, xi =y i for all i ≠ j,k for some j,k satisfying yj <y k,x j =y j +
δ and xk =y k - δ where 0 ≤ δ ≤ (yk–yj)/2.
Since a major concern of this paper is with the notion of reference groups, I turn now to
this latter issue. For every n∈N,l e tGn be the set of all possible partitions of the set
{1,...,n}, and define G to be the set ∪ n∈NGn. A typical element of the set G is a
partition g of the population, and a typical element of g is a subgroup, denoted by the
running index j. (It is immediate, of course, that for any partition g of the population, the
number of subgroups must be at least one, and cannot exceed the number of individuals
in the population). Notice that any g∈G is induced by some appropriate grouping of the
population, by which is meant some well-defined scheme of categorization (such as by
height, age, gender, caste, religion, etc.), in accordance with which the population can
be classified in a mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive fashion. (It is possible,
of course, that two or more groupings can induce the same partitioning of a given
population: for example, if in some society the only illiterate individuals all happen to
be females, then a grouping according to gender [{male, female}] will yield up the same
partition as a grouping according to literacy status [{literate, illiterate}].) For all x∈X
and g∈G, the pair (x,g) will be said to be compatible if and only if g partitions a
population of the same size as the dimensionality of x. Given any compatible pair (x,g)
belonging to X×G, subgroup j’s vector of incomes will be represented by x
j, for every j
belonging to g.
Two polar cases of grouping are of interest. The first is what one may call the ‘atomistic
grouping’, which induces the finest partition g
a = {{1},...,{i},...,{n}} of {1,...,n}: this
is the case of ‘complete heterogeneity’, such as might be precipitated by a classification
according to ‘finger-print type’. The second is what one may call the ‘universal
grouping’, which induces the coarsest partition g
u = {{1,...,n}} of {1,...,n}: this is the
case of ‘complete homogeneity’, such as might be precipitated by a classification
according, say, to membership to the human race.
2 This section is heavily dependent on Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999: especially pp. 197-200).
3 See Foster and Shorrocks (1991).5
We are now in a position to define a poverty index, by which shall be meant a mapping
P:T×X×G → R (where R is the real line), such that, for all z∈T, and all compatible
(x,g)∈X×G,P ( z , x,g) is a unique real number which is intended to signify the extent of
poverty that obtains in the regime (z,x,g). To invest P with more structure, we need to
constrain it with a set of properties that we may require the poverty index to satisfy.
What follows is a restricted set of just six axioms, of which the sixth4 is a relatively
recent addition to the stock of known axioms.
Symmetry (Axiom S).F o ra l lz ∈T,a l lx,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g) and (y,g)a r e
compatible pairs, if x is derived from y by a permutation, then P(z,x,g)=P ( z , y,g).
Monotonicity (Axiom M).F o ra l lz ∈T,a l lx,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g)a n d
(y,g) are compatible pairs, if x is derived from y by an increment to a poor person’s
income, then P(z,x,g)<P ( z , y,g).
Respect for Income Dominance (Axiom D). (See Amiel and Cowell, 1994.) For all
z∈T,a l lx,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g) and (y,g) are compatible pairs, if xP∨yP,
then P(z,x,g)<P ( z , y,g).
[Note: Amiel and Cowell (1994) point out that Axioms M and D are independent, but
are rendered equivalent in the presence of the symmetry axiom].
Transfer (Axiom T).F o ra l lz ∈T,a l lx,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g) and (y,g)a r e
compatible pairs, if xR = yR and xP is derived from yP by a permissible progressive
transfer, then P(z,x,g)<P ( z , y,g).
Subgroup Consistency (Axiom SC). (See Foster and Shorrocks, 1991.) For all z∈T,a l l
x,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g) and (y,g) are compatible pairs, if x
j and y
j are of the
same dimensionality for all j∈g and [P(z,x
j,g
u)=P ( z , y
j,g
u)f o ra l lj ∈g\{k} and P(z,x
k,g
u)
<P ( z , y
k,g
u) for some k∈g], then P(z,x,g)<P ( z , y,g).
Subgroup Sensitivity (Axiom SS).F o ra l lz ∈T,a l lx,y∈X and all g∈G such that (x,g)
and (y,g) are compatible pairs, if (i) x
j and y
j are of the same dimensionality for all j∈g;
(ii) µ
P(z,x)=µ
P(z,y); and (iii) x
j = y
j for all j∈g\{s,t} for some s,t satisfying P(z,x
t,g
u)




u)<P ( z , x
s,g
u); then it is the case that P(z,x,g)>P ( z , y,g).
[That is, other things remaining the same, if by a pure redistribution of poor incomes the
relatively disadvantaged subgroup s becomes less poor and the relatively advantaged
subgroup t becomes poorer, while maintaining the relative poverty rankings of the two
subgroups, then overall poverty should decline.]
What is the class of poverty indices which satisfy the property of subgroup sensitivity in
conjunction with some combination of other desirable properties discussed earlier? This
question is addressed in the next section.
4 The axiom of ‘subgroup sensitivity’ has been advanced in Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999).6
4 Two general possibility results for poverty indices
The following two propositions are true.
Proposition 4.1. There exists no poverty index P:T×X×G → R satisfying Axioms S, M
and SS.
Proof. What follows is a proof by contradiction. Consider a situation in which z = 50.
Let g be such that the population is partitioned into exactly two subgroups which are
indexed 1 and 2 respectively. Consider a pair of income vectors x,y such that n(xP)=








R = (60,60); and that
x
1
P = (10,20); x
2
P = (30,40); y
1
P = (10,30); and y
2





Further, since P satisfies Axioms S and M, it must satisfy Axiom D as well; and by















u)<P ( z , y
2,g
u)<P ( z , y
1,g
u)<P ( z , x
1,g
u).
In view of (4.1.1) and (4.1.2), Axiom SS will dictate that
(4.1.3) P(z,x,g)>P ( z , y,g).

















the person with income 20 in x
1











P . By Axiom S, one must have:
(4.1.4) P(z,x,g)=P ( z , y,g).
(4.1.3) and (4.1.4) are mutually incompatible, and this completes the proof of the
proposition. (Q.E.D.).
Proposition 4.2. There exists no poverty index P:T×X×G → R satisfying Axioms D, T
and SS.
Proof. Again we have a proof by contradiction. As in the proof of Proposition 4.1,
imagine a situation in which z = 50, and g is such as to partition the population into two
subgroups, 1 and 2. Let x and y be two income vectors satisfying n(xP)=n ( yP)=n ( xR)=








R = (60,60); x
1





P = (10,25); and y
2
















P , Axiom D will require
that
(4.2.2) P(z,x
2,g)<P ( z , y
2,g)<P ( z , y
1,g)<P ( z , x
1,g).
In view of (4.2.1) and (4.2.2), Axiom SS will dictate that
(4.2.3) P(z,x,g)>P ( z , y,g).7









permissible progressive transfer (of 5 from the person with income 25 in the vector y
1
P
to the person with income 15 in the vector y
2
P). Given, additionally, that n(x)=n ( y),
Axiom T will demand that
(4.2.4) P(z,x,g)<P ( z , y,g).
From (4.2.3) and (4.2.4), we obtain a contradiction. This completes the proof of the
proposition. (Q.E.D.).
5 Assessment
The two non-existence results presented in the preceding section confirm the wisdom of
a moral (suitably translated to the poverty-measurement context) that has been upheld
by Sen in his discussion of impossibility results in social choice theory. This moral
(Sen, 1970: 178) points to ‘the sever[ity] of the problem of postulating absolute
principles … that are supposed to hold in every situation’. Confronted with an
impossibility theorem, it is not always a simple matter to be able to convincingly
identify the ‘villain of the piece’, namely the guilty axiom that is driving the result
under review. Specifically, given the present context, and by way of illustration, neither
the transfer nor the subgroup sensitivity axiom is as persuasive as either may appear in a
context-free environment. For example, in particular cases the antecedents of Axiom SS
can be satisfied by a very regressive transfer (from an acutely impoverished person
belonging to a relatively advantaged subgroup to a much better-off individual belonging
to a relatively disadvantaged subgroup), and in such cases we may find it hard to
endorse Axiom SS. By the same token, any permissible progressive transfer between
two poor individuals would be encouraged by the transfer axiom, and in particular
cases, wherein such transfers exacerbate inter-group poverty differentials, we may find
it hard to accept Axiom T.
Given this general difficulty of discerning an unqualified virtue in any given axiom
under all plausible circumstances, a possible way out may be to restrict the applicability
of the axiom to a domain that is relatively non-controversial. In the specific instance of
the symmetry axiom, for example, there may be a case for requiring only that within any
subgroup, swapping incomes across members of the subgroup should leave the value of
the poverty index for the subgroup unchanged. In a between-group context, one might
further wish to impose the restriction that measured poverty should be invariant with
respect to the precise labels that are attached to subgroups. Similarly, in the case of the
transfer axiom, one may wish to restrict its operation, in its conventional form, only to
interpersonal redistributions of income within each subgroup. Is there also a way of
ensuring some requirement of equity, from a between-group perspective, in the
distribution of poverty across subgroups? How this can be done is perhaps best
exemplified by means of an illustration, discussed in the following section.
6 ‘Group-sensitive’ poverty indices: an example
Let P* be the set of all symmetric, monotonic, transfer-satisfying, and decomposable
poverty indices. (A poverty index is said to be decomposable – see Foster, Greer and8
Thorbecke, 1984 – if overall poverty can be expressed as a population-share weighted
sum of subgroup poverty levels). Let (x,g) be a compatible pair belonging to X×G,a n d
let g partition the population into K distinct subgroups. The poverty line, as usual, is
given by z. Consider P*∈P*, and let P*j serve as a shorthand for P*(z,x
j,g
u), which is
the poverty level, as measured by the index P*, of the jth subgroup (j = 1,…,K).
Assume, further, that the subgroups have been indexed in non-increasing order of
poverty, so that P*j ≥ P*j+1, j = 1,…,K–1. Let θj be the population share of the jth
subgroup, and Θj the proportion of the population that belongs to groups whose poverty
levels are less than or equal to the poverty level of the jth subgroup. Then, two examples
of aggregate poverty measures which directly incorporate considerations of ‘inter-group
equity’ are the indices 1Pa n d2P below:
(6.1) 1P(z,x,g) = [1/(K–1)][Σj=1




The index 1P is of a type discussed in Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999), Majumdar and
Subramanian (2001), and Subramanian and Majumdar (2002), while the index 2Pi so fa
type discussed in Anand and Sen (1995). In what follows, we shall confine attention to
the class of indices embodied in (6.2); and, in the interests of specificity, it would be
useful to particularize the index P* to a familiar poverty measure. To this end, consider
the so-called Pα class of indices proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984)
(FGT Pα), and given, for all z∈T and all compatible (x,g
u)∈X×G,b y :
(6.3) Pα (z,x,g
u)= ( 1 / n ( x))Σi∈Q(x) [(z–xi)/z]
α, α≥0
where Q(x) is the set of poor individuals in x. Each member of the class of indices Pα
(see FGT, 1984) is known to be symmetric and decomposable; and the index P2,i n
addition, satisfies the monotonicity and transfer axioms. Let us designate by F the index
P2. A specialization of the class of ‘between-group equity-conscious’ poverty measures
encompassed in (6.2) is yielded by the following index,5 F
a, which is given, for all z∈T,






In what sense does F
a attend to the concern for inter-group equity? One way of seeing




j–1] is the squared coefficient of variation in











Notice from (6.5) that the index F
a is just the average (across subgroups) level of
poverty, as measured by the index F, enhanced by a factor incorporating the squared
coefficient of variation in the inter-group distribution of poverty as measured by the Fj.
F
a is mean poverty ‘adjusted’ for inter-group inequality. (It may be noted that for the
5 The underlying logic of the poverty index F is motivationally similar to that of the ‘gender-adjusted
human development index’ of Anand and Sen (1995), which has been discussed in UNDP (1995).9
class of poverty indices subsumed in (6.1), the ‘adjustment’ for inequality in the inter-
group distribution of poverty levels is via a ‘Gini-type’, rather than ‘coefficient of
variation-type’, inequality measure.)
It is not difficult to check that the index F
a satisfies both the ‘within-group’ and the
‘between-group’ versions of the symmetry property discussed earlier. ‘Within-group’,
because it is a known property of the FGT Pα class of indices that each member satisfies
symmetry, and each of the Fj is just the FGT index realized for α = 2. ‘Between-group’,
because one can see from inspection of (6.4) that switching around the labels of the
subgroups will make no difference to the value of F
a.F u r t h e r ,F
a clearly also satisfies
the ‘within-group’ version of the transfer property, since each of the Fj is known to be
transfer-respecting (indeed, the Pα indices all satisfy transfer for every α > 1); while in a
‘between-group’ context, as the expression for F
a in (6.3) makes clear, it is sensitive to
inter-group inequality in the distribution of poverty: when the latter (as measured by C
2)
rises, other things equal, F
a also registers an increase in value.
An advantage with a poverty index such as F
a resides in a specific sort of ‘flexibility’ it
possesses, in that it effects a tradeoff between the conventional transfer axiom and
Axiom SS, by allowing the former to ‘trump’ the latter when interpersonal transfers
across groups are rather more than less ‘progressive’, and allowing the latter to ‘trump’
the former when interpersonal transfers across groups are rather less than more
‘progressive’. A simple example, similar to one in Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999),
might help to elucidate this point.
Let the poverty line z be given by 10. Let x and y be two 4-dimensional income vectors,
and let g
o be such as to partition the population into two subgroups 1 and 2 respectively,
with each subgroup having two persons in it. Similarly, let u and v be any other two
4-dimensional vectors, and let g
o again partition the population into the subgroups 1 and
2, with each subgroup having two members. The vectors x, y, u and v can be written,
respectively, as x =( x
1,x
2), y =( y
1,y
2), u =( u
1,u
2), and v =( v
1,v
2) .L e ti tb et h ec a s et h a t
x
1 = (1,9), x
2 = (1.5,3.5), y
1 = (0,9) and y
2 = (1.5,4.5); and u
1 = (1,9), u
2 = (1.5,2), v
1 =
(0,9) and v
2 = (1.5,3). Suppose we measure poverty by the ‘adjusted’ index F
a of (5.2).
Some routine computation will confirm that F(z,x
1,g





u) = 0.2525; F(z,y
2,g
u) = 0.25625; F
a(z,x,g





u) = 0.205; F(z,u
2,g
u) = 0.340625; F(z,v
1,g





o) = 0.2811; and F
a(z,v,g
o) = 0.2790. Notice now that y is derived from x
through a regressive transfer, exactly as v is derived from u through a regressive
transfer; in both cases, the transfer is from a poor person belonging to a relatively
advantaged group to a richer poor person belonging to a relatively disadvantaged group.




o), while the subgroup




o); in exactly similar fashion, the




o), while the subgroup sensitivity




o). What actually obtains is a situation in
which F
a(z,y,g
o) (= 0.2541) > F
a(z,x,g
o) (= 0.2490), and F
a(z,v,g
o) (= 0.2790) <
F
a(z,u,g
o) (= 0.2811). That is to say, in the transition from x to y, Axiom T is upheld and
Axiom SS violated, while in the transition from u to v, Axiom T is violated and Axiom
SS upheld. In both cases an interpersonally regressive income transfer has been
accompanied by a diminution in the inter-group poverty-differential; only, in the first
case the transfer has been more regressive than in the second (the income difference
between those involved in the transfer is greater in the first case than in the second), and
the poverty index F
a has effected a tradeoff in favour of the transfer axiom in the first10
case, and a tradeoff in favour of the subgroup sensitivity axiom in the second case. This
does not accord ill with intuition for, as was pointed out in Section 5,
in particular cases the antecedents of Axiom SS can be satisfied by a
very regressive transfer (from an acutely impoverished person belonging
to a relatively advantaged subgroup to a much better-off individual
belonging to a relatively disadvantaged subgroup), and in such cases we
may find it hard to endorse Axiom SS, [while], by the same token, any
permissible progressive transfer between two poor individuals would be
encouraged by the transfer axiom, and in particular cases, wherein such
transfers exacerbate inter-group poverty differentials, we may find it hard
to accept Axiom T.
Additionally, F
a has the convenient property of precipitating the index F as a special
case, which happens when the grouping employed is the universal grouping which
induces the coarsest partition g
u of the population. At the other extreme, when the
grouping employed is the atomistic one, which induces the finest partition g
a of the
population, it can be verified that F
a just becomes (P4)
1/2, where P4 is the Pα index for
α = 4. (The details are available in Jayaraj and Subramanian, 1999.)
Finally, a concrete empirical illustration of the information-value of an index such as F
a
may be useful. Making use of data on the cross-country distribution of per capita gross
national product (GNP) available in the United Nations Development Programme’s
Human Development Report (HDR), one can construct a picture of global poverty. Such
an exercise has been carried out in Subramanian (2003), and we draw on the results of
that exercise. The HDR 1999 provides information on per capita GNP, in ‘purchasing
power parity dollars’, for each of 174 countries for the year 1997. The global average
per capita GNP works out to a little in excess of PPP$6,000, and we shall take the
‘international poverty line’ to be PPP$3,000 per capita per annum – which is less than
one-half of the global average per capita GNP. We shall designate this poverty line by
z*; and let x* denote the country-wise distribution of income as presented in the HDR
1999. Since information on intra-country distribution is unavailable, we shall simply
assume that each person in each country receives the country’s average per capita GNP.
A grouping of countries resorted to in the HDR 1999 is a classification comprising the
following seven groups: sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the Arab states, Latin
America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States, Southern Europe, and Industrialized countries. Let us denote by g* the partition
of the world’s population induced by this particular grouping. Poverty for each country-
group j will now be measured by an index which one may call the triage headcount
ratio hj: for a poor country-group j (that is, a country-group whose per capita GNP is
less than the poverty line), hj is simply the proportion of the country-group’s population
that must be allocated an income of zero so that the average income of the rest of the
population in the country-group is enabled to rise to the poverty line level of income z*;
and for a nonpoor country-group j, we shall take hj to be zero. By this reckoning, the
proportion of the world’s population — call it h — that must just cease to exist in order
that every remaining person may receive an income of z* works out to 18.6 per cent –
the details are provided in Table 1. More specifically, this is the value of the triage
headcount ratio corresponding to the universal grouping g
u:h ( z * , x*,g
u) = 0.186. What if
we employed the grouping g*r e s o r t e dt oi nt h eHDR 1999?T h eadjusted triage11





Sub-Saharan Africa 555.20 0.0967 0.6048
Asia and the Pacific 3140.30 0.5467 0.2126
Arab states 252.30 0.0439 0.1012
Latin America and the
Caribbean (including Mexico) 490.50 0.0854 0.0167




Southern Europe 64.20 0.0112 0.0000
Industrialized countries 842.30 0.1466 0.0000
World 5743.70 1.0000 0.1863
Note: The poverty line is taken to be PPP$3,000 per capita per annum (roughly one-half the average
per capita GNP). The ‘triage headcount ratio’ is the proportion of the population that must be
allowed to perish so that each member of the surviving population is enabled to just achieve a
poverty-line level of income.





1/2 turns to be 0.247, as can be confirmed from
the figures presented in Table 1. The rise in the triage headcount ratio from 18.6 per
cent to 24.7 per cent is a substantial one, and an indicator of the considerable inequality
in the cross-country distribution of deprivation. If this outcome is an unattractive one,
the picture, presumably, would be even worse if the grouping we employed classified
the world not into 7 groups, but into 174 groups – each group being represented by an
individual country. Incorporating inter-group differentials into an overall assessment of
deprivation certainly shows up in the deeply stratified world in which we live.
7 Two implications of ‘group-sensitivity’ in a poverty measure
The particular grouping of a population we resort to must be informed by an
appreciation of the sociological salience of the classificatory scheme we adopt. More
than one classificatory scheme may be relevant, depending on the precise context in,
and purpose for which, deprivation is being sought to be measured. It is therefore a
matter of some importance, in making poverty comparisons, to be explicit not only
about the distributions under comparison and the poverty line(s) employed, but also
about the grouping invoked. A certain ranking, valid for poverty measured with a
particular grouping in mind, could in principle be inverted by a ranking which is valid
for poverty measured with some other grouping in mind. An example of such rank
reversal has in fact already been considered in Section 6. Harking back to the income
vectors u and v reviewed in Section 6, it can be verified that, when z = 10, F
a(z,u,g
u)
(= 0.2728) < F
a(z,v,g
u) (= 0.2778), but F
a(z,u,g
o) (= 0.2811) > F
a(z,v,g
o) (= 0.2790). A
first implication of working with ‘group-sensitive’ poverty measures, therefore, is that12
the particular grouping we employ can make a substantial difference to the evaluative
outcome of poverty comparisons.
Second, the grouping that is employed also has implications for ‘targeting’ in poverty
redress schemes. Again, a simple numerical illustration might be helpful in explicating
the idea. Let the poverty line be z′ = 10, and let a be a 4-dimensional income vector
(namely n(a)=4 ) .L e tg′ be a partition of the population, based, let us say, on a




1=( a 11,a12)a n da
2 =( a 21,a22), where aji stands for the income of the ith
person in the jth group (j = 1,2 and i = 1,2). Suppose, for specificity, that a
1 = (4,6) and
a
2 = (3,9). If θj is the population share of subgroup j (j = 1,2), then it is clear that in the
present instance θ1 = θ2 =1 / 2 .L e tg
u be an alternative partitioning of the population,
induced by the universal grouping, which recognizes only one group, that constituted by
the grand coalition of individuals. Suppose a budgetary allocation of T = 5 is available
for poverty alleviation. Which is the best way of allocating the budget among the
individuals in the population?
To complicate matters, we shall imagine that there are two policymakers, A and B, of
whom A – who has no time for sociological affectations – believes that g
u is the only
valid partitioning of the population, while B – who herself is a member of an
underprivileged caste – believes that g′ is a meaningful partition of the population.
Policymaker A is comfortable with using the poverty index F(z,x) (which, to recall, is
the same as the index F
a(z,x,g
u)), while policymaker B is comfortable with using the
index F
a(z,x,g). Let tji, in B’s notation, be the amount of the budgetary allocation T
which goes to the ith individual in the jth group (j = 1,2 and i = 1,2), and denote by t the
vector (t11,t12,t21,t22); further, let t
1 and t
2 stand for the vectors (t11,t12)a n d( t 21,t22)
respectively. (Of course, the individuals that B calls 11, 12, 21 and 22 will probably be
called just 1, 2, 3 and 4 by A, but since the latter believes in a thoroughgoing version of
the symmetry axiom, his philosophy of ‘what’s in a name?’ should be compatible with
an acceptance of B’s eccentric mode of labelling the individuals.)




u)=[ 1 / n ( a)(z′)
2][{z′–(a11 +t 11)}
2 +{ z ′–(a12 +t 12)}
2 +
{z′–(a21 +t 21)}




t11 +t 12 +t 21 +t 22 ≤ Ta n d
0 ≤ t11 ≤ z′–a11,0≤ t12 ≤ z′–a12,0≤ t21 ≤ z′–a21, and 0 ≤ t22 ≤ z′–a22
The optimal solution to this problem is the so-called ‘lexicographic maximin’ solution
(see Bourguignon and Fields, 1990, and Gangopadhyay and Subramanian, 1992). The
solution consists in raising the poorest person’s income to the income of the second
poorest person if the budget will permit, or to the highest feasible level not exceeding
the second poorest person’s income; if the budgetary outlay is thereby exhausted, we13
stop the exercise here, and if not, the incomes of the two poorest individuals are raised
to the income of the third poorest person if the budget will permit, or to the highest
feasible level not exceeding the third poorest person’s income; and so on, until we reach
that marginal individual with whom the budget is exhausted. Given the specific
numerical values we have assigned to the poverty line z′, the income vector a, and the
budgetary outlay T, it can be verified that the optimal solution to Problem A is provided
by
(7.1) t*11=2 ,t * 12=0 ,t * 21=3 ,a n dt * 22=0
The resulting, post-transfer income vector is given by
(7.2) a*=( a 11 +t * 11,a 12 +t * 12,a 21 +t * 21,a 22 +t * 22) = (6,6,6,9)
Next, policymaker B’s problem can be written as follows.
Problem B
Minimize F














t11 +t 12 +t 21 +t 22≤ Ta n d
0 ≤ t11 ≤ z′–a11,0≤ t12 ≤ z′–a12,0≤ t21 ≤ z′–a21 and 0 ≤ t22 ≤ z′–a22
Will the transfer schedule t* presented in (7.1) also be an optimal solution to
Problem B? It can be verified, given the numerical assumptions we have made
regarding θ1, θ2,z ′ and T, that F
a(z′,a + t*,g′) = 0.1281. If there is no other allocation
t** such that F
a(z′,a + t**,g′) < 0.1281, then t* is an optimal solution to Problem B.
However, consider the transfer schedule t** given by
(7.3) t**11 = 2.4558, t**12 = 0.4558, t**21 = 2.0884 and t**22 =0 .
It is easy to check that F
a(z′,a + t**,g′) = 0.1256 < F
a(z′,a + t*,g′) = 0.1281. Since
poverty is lower with the transfer schedule t** than with the schedule t*, it is clear that
t*i snot an optimal solution to Problem B. (In fact, t** solves Problem B. This claim
will not be proved here, but it may be noted that an intuitive sufficient condition for an
optimum is a feasible transfer schedule which (a) respects the lexicographic maximin
principle of allocation within each subgroup, and (b) simultaneously ensures
equalization of poverty levels between subgroups. In the present instance, note that
a
1 + t
1** = (6.4558,6.4558) and a
1 + t
2** = (5.0884,9): the lexicographic maximin
outcome obtains within each subgroup, and further, subgroup poverty levels are









Briefly, policymakers A and B have a quarrel – and a substantial one at that – on their
hands. While quarrels over the choice of the poverty line z have been numerous,
quarrels over the choice of g have been relatively muted, with the implicit consensus
favouring policymaker A’s approach to the problem. Yet, both choices have
implications not only for poverty comparisons but also for the proper targeting of scarce14
resources in poverty alleviation programmes. There would thus appear to be a case for
an explicit statement of the precise choice of g that is made, and for a justification of
that choice. The issue assumes a particular salience in the context of societies
characterized by stratification arising from the historically cumulated maldistribution of
burdens and benefits across identifiable subgroups of the population. For analysts
concerned with the measurement of poverty and anti-poverty policy based on such
measurement, the issue resolves itself into not just a problem in logic but into a larger
problem in social ethics.
8 Concluding observations
In much of mainstream economic theorizing, the only ‘marker’ of identity is income.
This is quite clearly evident in, for example, standard approaches to the measurement of
poverty. The point is made explicit in Sen’s (1976) seminal paper dealing with the
derivation of an ordinal measure of poverty, in which he draws specific attention to an
assumption which is at the welfare basis of many poverty measures, and which he calls
the ‘Monotonic Welfare’ axiom. According to this axiom, given any income vector x
and any pair of individuals j and k with incomes xj and xk respectively, if xj >x k, then
Wj(x)>W k(x), where Wj (respectively, Wk) is the welfare level of individual j
(respectively, individual k). It should be emphasized that Sen is himself sceptical of the
universal validity of this axiom, and employs it largely in the spirit of assembling
material for a characterization theorem. In a richer framework of welfare, the latter
would presumably be a function of arguments other than just income. Specifically, room
would have to be made for the notion, as Akerlof and Kranton (2000: 718) put it, that
‘identity is based on social categories…’, and the fact that income classes do not
exhaust social categories. If a person’s identity, and the welfare she experiences,
depends not only on her income but also, for example, on the colour of her skin, then it
is entirely conceivable that, given an income vector x and an n-tuple s describing each
individual’s skin colour, one can have a pair of individuals j and k such that xj >x k,ji s
black and k is white, and Vj(x,s)<V k(x,s), where Vi (i = 1,…,n) stands for person i’s
welfare level, and each person’s welfare level is assumed to be increasing in her/his
income, other things equal. In terms of the standard symmetry axiom, aggregate welfare
and poverty levels should remain unchanged if j and k were to swap their incomes;
however, in terms of the welfare index V, one can easily see that black j would be
rendered worse off and white k would be ren d e r e db e t t e ro f fi fja n dkw e r et os w a p
incomes. Similarly, the standard transfer axiom would endorse a permissible
progressive income transfer from j to k; however, such a transfer would only serve to
widen the welfare-gap (when welfare is measured by V) between the two individuals. It
is clear then that allowing for a plurality of groups in society does have non-trivial
implications for the measurement of society-wide deprivation, a point that is
emphasized by Thurow (1981: 179, 180, 182):
Is the correct economic strategy to resist group welfare measures and
group redistribution programmes wherever possible? Or do groups have
a role to play in economic justice? … [I]t is not possible for society to
determine whether it is or is not an equal opportunity society without
collecting and analyzing economic data on groups … Individuals have to
be judged based on group data … A concern for groups is unavoidable.15
This note has been concerned to explore an aspect of the analytics of poverty
measurement as a specific application of the exercise of complicating mainstream
accounts of the economy by allowing for the pervasive reality of the stratification of
society into groups. In the process, it points to two issues that could be salient in a
consideration of how to accommodate subgroup poverty in the aggregation exercise of
measuring income-deprivation. First, it suggests the desirability of the poverty index
being a variable, rather than trivial or constant, function of the precise grouping that is
employed in partitioning a population into subgroups. By entering the grouping
explicitly as an argument in the poverty function, the domain of the function is
informationally expanded in a way that enriches a group-sensitive assessment of
poverty. Second, it suggests that if it is considered desirable to directly incorporate into
the measurement of poverty considerations relating to the inter-group distribution of
poverty, then certain conventional axioms of poverty measurement may have to be
modified, via restrictions on their domains of applicability, in order to avoid problems
of internal consistency in the aggregation exercise.
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